




A NEEDLE IN A HAYSTACK?  
LOCATING THE LEGAL BASIS FOR DETENTION  







April marks the end of winter in the Helmand Province, but mornings can still be bitterly cold. 
In the early hours of 7 April 2010, however, the weather was the least of Mr. Serdar 
Mohammed’s problems. Before the sky turned to dawn, he was captured in the fields not far 
from his home by the UK armed forces. Shot at, bitten by an army dog, and finally apprehended, 
he was brought into UK custody on suspicion of being an insurgent, perhaps even a Taliban 
commander. He would go on to spend more than 100 days in detention on various British 
military bases in Afghanistan before being finally handed over to the Afghan authorities.1 
The case that Mr. Mohammed initiated before the UK courts, Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of 
Defence, has been much more than a simple dispute over compensation for the alleged unlawful 
deprivation of liberty. The resulting first-instance ruling was issued in May 2014, a little more 
than four years after the events that resulted in the claimant’s detention. With a degree of 
English understatement, the judge described it as ‘a long judgement which discusses many issues 
and arguments’.2 It is, in fact, 117 pages long and covers nearly every question of international 
law that one can imagine, from the jus ad bellum, to human rights law, IHL, State responsibility, 
and State immunity. The judge eventually held in favour of the claimant, ruling that his detention 
after the initial 96 hours violated Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
that he was therefore entitled to compensation.3 
Crucially, the case revisited an unresolved issue of IHL: does this body of law authorize the 
detention of persons in non-international armed conflicts (“NIACs”)? In other words, does the 
law of NIAC contain a legal basis for detention?4 The answer to that question could have swayed 
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the pendulum one way or the other. This is because if there was such a legal basis, the UK armed 
forces could have been justified in holding the claimant for a prolonged period of time for 
security reasons. Conversely, the finding that IHL does not provide a legal basis for detention in 
NIACs5 led the judge down the road of finally deciding for the claimant and against the 
Government.6 
The question of the existence of a legal basis to detain within the law of NIAC is an issue of 
fundamental importance for the conduct of hostilities in the 21st century, and one which exceeds 
the confines of any single case. Today, the overwhelming majority of conflicts around the world 
are NIACs. Like in their international counterparts, parties to NIACs frequently detain persons 
for security reasons. By definition, at least one of the parties to a NIAC is a non-State actor: an 
armed group like the Taliban in Afghanistan or the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the 
Philippines. Moreover, some of the modern NIACs are so-called ‘extraterritorial NIACs’ in 
which an outside State is (or several States are) pitted against an armed group on another State’s 
territory: again, an example being the conflict between a multinational coalition supporting the 
Afghan Government and various insurgent forces in Afghanistan.7 Finally, an international 
armed conflict (IAC) may evolve into a NIAC, as the Iraqi conflict did after the US-led military 
coalition withdrew from Iraq.8 In all of these situations, locating a legal basis for detention 
elsewhere than in IHL may be problematic. This is why a close examination of the law of NIAC 
is necessary. 
This article begins with an introduction of the problem of an absence of an express legal basis 
to detain in the law of NIAC by way of contrasting the provisions regulating detention in IACs 
and NIACs, respectively. It will consider whether the legal basis for detention in NIACs could 
be logically inferred either from a putative power to kill in NIACs or from the power to detain in 
IACs. In the next step, it will consider teleological and practical arguments posed against the 
existence of a legal basis to detain. Finally, it will put forward a threefold set of reasons which 
together militate in favour of the legal basis for detention under NIAC.  
II. ABSENCE OF AN EXPRESS LEGAL BASIS TO DETAIN IN THE LAW OF NIAC 
Insofar as international armed conflicts are concerned, the law is enviably clear. Combatants 
become prisoners of war upon capture9 and are subject to internment by the enemy State.10 A 
State may intern civilians in its own territory if it is ‘absolutely necessary’ for its security.11 In 
occupied territories, the internment of civilians is permitted if the Occupying Power considers it 
‘necessary, for imperative reasons of security’.12 What these provisions have in common is that 
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they establish an express legal basis for internment of a class of persons, without requiring an 
individualized assessment before depriving anyone of their liberty. 
No such express legal basis exists in the treaty law applicable in non-international armed 
conflicts. To be sure, the law contemplates that detention will take place during such conflicts. 
Common Article 3 mandates humane treatment and prohibits certain acts with respect to several 
categories of persons including those placed hors de combat by detention.13 Article 5 of Additional 
Protocol II provides detailed guarantees to ‘those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to 
the armed conflict’14 and Article 6 of the same instrument encourages amnesty to the same 
category of people at the end of hostilities.15 However, none of these provisions contains an 
unequivocal authorization to detain in NIACs. 
It is conceivable that the parties to a non-international conflict may agree to transpose the 
legal basis from the law of IAC by way of an ad hoc agreement.16 Such ‘special agreements’, 
bringing into force specific provisions of the Geneva Conventions are even expressly 
encouraged by Common Article 3.17 It must, however, be emphasized that the possibility of such 
agreements does not amount to a systematic response to the problem at the heart of this 
discussion. They would remain an ad hoc solution for particular conflicts only. What is more, 
many of the actual agreements entered into by conflict parties in the context of NIACs contain 
provisions on the treatment of detainees, but do not provide for a specific legal basis for 
detention.18 Thus, even in these situations the problem of the absence of a generally applicable 
legal basis for detention arises with equal force. 
Be that as it may, it would be wrong to infer that the absence of an express authorization 
automatically means that no legal basis exists under IHL.19 International law, as a legal system 
developed incrementally and on the basis of careful compromise between States as its primary 
actors, does not always provide clear-cut written legislative solutions for all potential problems 
that the reality may bring.20 It is thus often generally accepted without much controversy that 
legal basis authorizing specific conduct may be implied from the relevant treaty text21 or found in 
                                                          
13 Common Art. 3(1) to the Geneva Conventions. 
14 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (hereinafter: “AP II”), Art. 5(1). 
15 AP II, supra note 14, Art. 6(5). 
16 See, e.g., N. V. Amstel, “In Search of Legal Grounds to Detain for Armed Groups”, 3 Int’l Humanitarian L. Studies 
160, 183–186 (2012). 
17 Common Art. 3(3) to the Geneva Conventions (‘The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring 
into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.’). 
18 See, e.g., San José Agreement between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la 
Liberación Nacional (FMLN) of 26 July 1990 (UN Doc. A/44/971–S/21541), Art. 2; Memorandum of Understanding 
between Yugoslavia and Croatia of 27 November 1991, reproduced in Marco Sassòli, Antoine A. Bouvier and Anne 
Quintin, How Does Law Protect in War?, vol. 3 (3rd ed., ICRC 2011) at 111, Arts. 3 and 4. 
19 Cf. Serdar Mohammed, supra note 1, para. 242 (“if CA3 and/or AP2 had been intended to provide a power to detain 
they would have done so expressly’). 
20 See also H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (6th ed., 1985) 299, 300 (arguing 
that vagueness and ambiguity are a frequent feature of international agreements as they allow States to find a 
common basis on which the different national interests can meet in harmony). 
21 See, e.g., Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. Rep., para. 110 (accepting that the legal basis 
for specific conduct of the Security Council may be implied from the text of the UN Charter); Prosecutor v. Tadić, 
4 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS (MANUSCRIPT) 
customary international law.22 To identify the legal basis in this way should be seen as an 
affirmation of the principle of legality, not as its violation.23 
The absence of an express legal basis in the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols may in 
fact be explained more prosaically. The States’ representatives at the diplomatic conferences 
leading to the adoption of these instruments were reluctant to agree on any rules that might be 
understood as lending a degree of recognition to non-State actors in internal conflicts.24 It was 
for this reason that the Geneva Conventions were limited in their coverage of NIACs to one 
article only, which was moreover capped with an unambiguous reminder that its application 
‘shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict’.25 Even more pertinently, all 
references to ‘parties to the conflict’ were deleted from the final text of Protocol II at the 
eleventh hour during the diplomatic conference precisely for fears that the phrase would 
unacceptably place the entities involved in the conflict on an equal footing.26 As we will see 
below, this does not mean that the drafters did not accept that parties to NIACs would resort to 
detention or (even less) that they considered detention automatically unlawful.27 They were 
merely reluctant to include any provisions or even formulations which could be ‘interpreted in 
the sense of a recognition of insurgent parties’.28 
III. LIMITATIONS OF ATTEMPTS TO TRANSPOSE THE LEGAL BASIS  
FROM OTHER CONTEXTS 
It is sometimes suggested that the power to detain necessarily follows from the power to target 
individuals.29 To some extent, this is logically appealing. Surely if one may lawfully kill an 
opponent, it must be equally permissible to merely incapacitate her by placing her under 
detention. However, upon closer inspection, this argument is not as compelling. First of all, it 
glosses over the fact that not everyone liable to be detained is equally liable to be targeted in the 
first place. In other words, some individuals may pose a security risk to a party to a conflict 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A (ICTY App. Chamber, 15 July 1999), paras. 185–229 (holding that the legal basis 
for joint criminal enterprise, a mode of criminal liability, is implied in the text of the ICTY Statute). 
22 See, e.g., M. Byers, War Law, 64(2005) (considering that invitation is widely accepted as a legal basis for 
intervention under customary international law). 
23 Cf. E. Debuf, Captured in War: Lawful Internment in Armed Conflict, 469 (2013) (‘an implicit restriction of the right to 
liberty would flout the principle of legality’). 
24 See Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 1335, para. 4415 
(ICRC, Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, & B. Zimmerman eds., 1987) (hereinafter: “ICRC Commentary”). 
25 Common Art. 3(4) to the Geneva Conventions. 
26 See, e.g., Switzerland, Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974–1977) (Federal Political Department 1978) (hereinafter: 
“Official Records”), vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.40, at 426, para. 29 (Iraq); ibid., vol. VII, CDDH/SR.49, at 65, para. 33 
(Saudi Arabia); ibid., CDDH/SR.56, at 219–220, paras. 124–129 (Zaire).  
27 See text to notes 82–89 infra. 
28 See ICRC Commentary, supra note 24, at 1335, para. 4415. 
29 See, e.g., R. Goodman, “The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict”, 103 Am. J. Int’l L. 48, 55–56; J. K. 
Kleffner, “Operational Detention and the Treatment of Detainees”, The Handbook of the International Law of Military 
Operations, 471 (T. D. Gill & D. Fleck eds., 2010); C. Kreß, “Some Reflections on the International Legal Framework 
Governing Transnational Armed Conflicts” 15 J. Conflict Security L. 245, 263–264 (2010); S. Sivakumaran, The Law of 
Non-International Armed Conflict, 301 (2012); Serdar Mohammed, supra note 1, para. 252 (referring to the position of the 
UK Ministry of Defence). 
 A NEEDLE IN A HAYSTACK? 5 
without directly participating in the hostilities. With respect to these persons the argument would 
not suffice.  
Secondly and even more crucially, if the legal basis for detention is to be inferred from the 
law of targeting, one should be able to locate an express legal basis authorizing the killing of 
individuals in situations of NIAC. However — and again in contrast to the law of IAC30 — the 
applicable treaty law does not contain any such express legal basis.31 Instead, it merely protects 
civilians from being made the object of attack unless they take a direct part in the hostilities.32 
Therefore, the argument that the power to detain is a corollary of the power to target does not 
resolve the underlying problem, but merely restates it with equal force in another context.33 
Somewhat similarly, it can be argued that if it is permissible to detain in IACs, it should 
logically be permissible to do so in NIACs.34 This argument rests on the observation that States 
have accepted more onerous obligations under the law applicable in IACs than in NIACs.35 
Because of that, any grant of authority to engage in a particular conduct in IACs should, a fortiori, 
be seen as affirming their authority to do so in NIACs.36 The obvious weakness of this argument 
is that it only substantiates a legal basis for detention measures taken by the government side to 
an armed conflict. Any detainees held by a non-State party to the conflict would still be held 
unlawfully.37  
Most importantly, the argument’s premise itself is not free from doubt either. In particular, it 
is questionable whether IHL is ‘uniformly less restrictive’ in NIACs than in IACs.38 In fact, there 
are several areas in which the law of NIAC is more onerous and exacts a greater degree of 
protection than its counterpart applicable to IACs.39 For example, while the law of IAC only 
prohibits deportation of protected persons from occupied territory,40 in NIACs, the prohibition 
on deportation applies generally to the entire territory affected by the conflict.41 It would thus be 
                                                          
30 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (hereinafter: “AP I”), Art. 43(2). 
31 But see, e.g., ICRC Commentary, supra note 24, at 1453, para. 4789 (“Those who belong to armed forces or armed 
groups may be attacked at any time.”). 
32 See AP II, supra note 14, Art. 13(3); see also Common Art. 3(1)(a) to the Geneva Conventions and AP II, supra note 
14, Art. 4(2)(a) (prohibiting violence to life and person with respect to persons taking no active part in the 
hostilities). 
33 See, e.g., J. Cerone, “Jurisdiction and Power: The Intersection of Human Rights Law & the Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict in an Extraterritorial Context” 40 Isr. L. Rev. 396, 411 (2007) (arguing that the law of 
NIAC does not provide an ‘authorization … to detain or kill’) (emphasis added). 
34 See Goodman, supra note 29, at 50, 57. 
35 Ibid., at 50. 
36 Ibid. 
37 A possible objection is based on a premise that non-State actors are not bound by the prohibition on arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty since the latter is a norm that only binds States. If that is the case, the argument goes, armed 
groups are not acting unlawfully by resorting to detention. Rather, their conduct is normatively neutral from the 
perspective of international law. However, this approach is potentially even more dangerous. As Somer has warned, 
it would mean allowing armed groups to detain with impunity, thus further discouraging their compliance with IHL. 
J. Somer, “Jungle Justice: Passing Sentence on the Equality of Belligerents in Non-international Armed Conflict” 89 
Int’l Rev. Red Cross 655, 667–668 (2007). 
38 See Goodman, supra note 29, at 50. 
39 See further Sivakumaran, supra note 29, at 68–69. 
40 GC IV, supra note 11, Art. 49. 
41 AP II, supra note 14, Art. 17(2). 
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incorrect to infer the legal basis to detain in NIACs simply on the basis of it being permissible in 
IACs. 
IV. LIMITATIONS OF ARGUMENTS AGAINST A LEGAL BASIS TO DETAIN 
If a legal power to detain cannot be inferred logically from other provisions of IHL, it is 
necessary to examine whether the law of NIAC can be said to be agnostic with respect to the 
lawfulness of detention. Accordingly, it could be argued that provisions contemplating detention 
in NIACs do no more than that—they acknowledge that people will be detained during armed 
conflicts but do not provide authorization for such detention. This is a compelling argument. 
After all, the distinction between the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum reflects the fact that IHL as a 
legal discipline is itself built on agnosticism vis-à-vis the lawfulness of the recourse to force 
between the conflict parties in the first place.42 Although IHL certainly acknowledges that force 
will be used, it cannot be read as providing any legal authority to do so.43 Perhaps the same logic 
should be applied to the regulation of detention in NIACs. On this view, the law of NIAC is 
limited in its remit to some of the consequences of the fact of detention, while remaining 
normatively neutral vis-à-vis that fact itself. 
The fundamental problem of this approach is that it potentially leaves a number of situations 
in which detainees are taken without an available legal basis. It has been suggested that this basis 
can be found in other applicable bodies of law, in particular in international human rights law 
(“IHRL”), the domestic law, or in a Security Council resolution.44  
This suggestion is the least convincing with respect to IHRL. Significant initial hurdles need 
to be overcome in order to even consider it as a potential solution to the problem at hand. First, 
it is not clear that the stipulations of this body of law apply equally to States as they do to armed 
groups; this remains a heavily contested issue at the moment.45 Second, given that the rules of 
IHRL were developed for peacetime, it is potentially problematic to attempt to transpose them 
into situations of armed violence.46  
However, even if these two hurdles were surpassed, it would be a misinterpretation to 
construe the IHRL rules on detention as permissive norms authorizing the deprivation of liberty 
in particular situations. The tenor of these rules is, in fact, exactly the opposite. IHRL norms 
prohibit detention which does not meet all the requisite conditions linked to the right to security 
and liberty of a person. Without exception, each applicable instrument includes among these 
                                                          
42 See, e.g., Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (2nd ed., CUP 2010) 3–4. 
43 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (2nd ed., 1912), vol. II, at 60 (‘War is a fact recognised, and with 
regard to many points regulated, but not established, by International Law.’) (emphasis added). 
44 See A. S. Deeks, “Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict” (2009) 40 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 403, at 404–405 and 413; P. Rowe, “Is There a Right to Detain Civilians by Foreign Armed 
Forces During a Non-International Armed Conflict?” (2012) 61 ICLQ 697, at 706–709; Debuf, supra note 23, at 
488–495. 
45 See, e.g., J. M. Henckaerts and C. Wiesener, “Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups: A Possible 
Contribution from Customary International Law?”, Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (R. 
Kolb and G. Gaggioli eds., 2013), at 146–169. 
46 J. Pejić, “Conflict Classification and the Law Applicable to Detention and the Use of Force”, International Law and 
the Classification of Conflicts (E. Wilmshurst, 2012), at 84–85 and 93–94. 
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conditions the requirement of a legal basis for detention.47 IHRL is a restrictive body of law 
which provides limits on the permissible behaviour of States.48 It is incorrect to see it as 
authorizing detention on its own terms; instead, we need to look elsewhere for a legal basis to 
ensure that detention is IHRL compliant. 
It is true that at times, this legal basis can be found in the applicable domestic law or a 
Security Council resolution. However, this will often not be sufficient. As the examples of 
Afghanistan and Yemen show, not all States’ legislation contains an applicable legal basis for 
security internment in times of armed conflict.49 Although this could theoretically be remedied by 
the introduction of emergency legislation providing for such a legal basis, this is often not a 
realistic prospect in conflicts fought extraterritorially that have come to define our time. Besides, 
any reliance on domestic law may be unworkable in time of breakdown of order brought about 
by the internal conflict. Moreover, even if a legal basis of this sort may be found in one of these 
sources, it will typically only permit detention measures to be taken by one side of the conflict, 
most likely the territorial government. In all of these situations, IHL thus presents the only 
remaining plausible legal structure on the basis of which detention may be authorized. 
The risk that detention measures would be taken without a legal basis is patently not merely 
an academic issue. Detention that lacks a legal basis must be considered arbitrary.50 The ICJ has 
described arbitrary detention in the Tehran Hostages case as ‘manifestly incompatible with the 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations’.51 Arbitrary detention, if committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, may amount to a crime 
against humanity of imprisonment.52 Even when the victim is a single individual, arbitrary 
detention is a violation of international human rights law provisions on the right to liberty and 
security of person.53 Furthermore, according to the ICRC Study on Customary International 
                                                          
47 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 211 
(hereinafter: “ECHR”), Art. 5(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(hereinafter: “ICCPR”), Art. 9(1); American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (hereinafter: 
“ACHR”), Art. 7(2); African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (hereinafter: “ACHPR”), 
Art. 6. 
48 See, e.g., S. Sheeran, “The Relationship of International Human Rights Law and General International Law: 
Hermeneutic Constraint, or Pushing the Boundaries?”, Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights Law 83 (S. 
Sheeran & N. Rodley eds., 2013) (stating that IHRL is based on ‘the inherent dignity of the human being and 
constraint of state or public power’) [internal quotation marks omitted]. 
49 See Serdar Mohammed, supra note 1, para. 75 (holding that Afghan law does not provide ‘for detention by foreign 
armed forces operating in Afghanistan – or for that matter by the Afghan army’); Cable from the US Embassy in 
Sanaa, Yemen to the US Secretary of State, 8 November 2007, para. 12 (‘The lack of strong counterterrorism laws in 
Yemen means that, even when terrorists are caught, the [government] often lacks the legal basis to hold them.’). 
50 See Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Judgement, Case No. IT-06-90-T (ICTY Trial Chamber, 15 April 2011), para. 1815 
(deprivation of liberty is carried out arbitrarily if there is no legal basis for it); Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Župljanin, 
Judgement, Case No. IT-08-91-T (ICTY Trial Chamber, 27 March 2013), para. 78 (ditto); see also, e.g., Denizci and 
others v. Cyprus [2001] European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: “ECtHR”), paras. 392–393 (the absence of a legal 
basis for detention amounts to a violation of the right to liberty and security under the ECHR); Medvedyev v. France 
[2010] ECtHR, paras. 102–103 (lack of a legal basis of the requisite quality violates the right to liberty and security 
under the ECHR). 
51 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), [1980] I.C.J. Rep. 3, at 42.  
52 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, Art. 7(1)(e); Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1159, Art. 5(e); Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598, Art. 3(e). 
53 ECHR, supra note 47, Art. 5(1); ICCPR, supra note 47, Art. 9(1); ACHR, supra note 47, Art. 7(2); ACHPR, supra 
note 47, Art. 6. 
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Humanitarian Law, it is also a violation of customary IHL norms applicable both in IACs and 
NIACs.54 Arbitrary deprivation of liberty thus amounts to unlawful conduct under all of these 
legal regimes with potentially serious consequences including criminal prosecution. 
It is hardly satisfactory to accept that an omnipresent feature of modern-day armed conflicts 
— which detention surely is — would in fact be unlawful and amount to continuous violations 
of human rights and other bodies of law. We have thus come full circle. Either we manage to 
find the legal basis in the apparent normative silence of IHL, or we must bear the overpowering 
thunder of ubiquitous non-compliance. The former solution would certainly appear to be — as 
even some opponents admit — motivated by a ‘sense of logic’.55 After all, as noted above, in 
addition to other bodies of law, IHL prohibits arbitrary deprivation of liberty too.56 It would be 
illogical for it to prohibit behaviour indispensable for the conduct of hostilities, thereby 
effectively legally emasculating one or both conflict parties.57  
However, one should not place much reliance on logic itself. In this respect, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s famous aphorism usefully reminds us of the limits of such reasoning: ‘The life of the 
law has not been logic: it has been experience.’58 In the context of IHL proper, Professor Schmitt 
similarly notes that ‘it would be wrong to assume that IHL – the product of either negotiation 
between states or pervasive state practice influenced by national interests – is seamless, logical in 
every circumstance’.59 Since logic is a desirable goal, but not the only consideration nor a 
necessary prerequisite, it is necessary to examine the arguments advanced to justify the no-legal-
basis position. It is submitted that if these are found wanting, we may return to the dictates of 
logic as to a starting point of our inquiry and see if it can be corroborated by other perspectives. 
Two arguments—teleological and practical—against the existence of the legal power to detain 
stand out in the literature and the emerging case-law. According to the first one, the relevant 
provisions of IHL have a humanitarian purpose and it would be inconsistent with this purpose 
to interpret them as providing a legal power for detention.60 This position’s unsaid assumption is 
that there is something inherently ‘antihumanitarian’ about detention measures. However, it is 
not at all certain that such assumption accurately captures the reality of modern-day armed 
conflicts. At times, security internment measures seem to enhance rather than impede 
humanitarian aims, such as when they are undertaken in anticipation of a terrorist attack in order 
to protect the civilian population. 
More importantly, humanitarian considerations are but one part of the equation explaining 
the telos of IHL. The rules of IHL are more fittingly described as being based on ‘a dialectical 
                                                          
54 See Customary International Humanitarian Law (J. M. Henckaerts & L. Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (hereinafter: 
“CIHLS”), rule 99.  
55 Debuf, supra note 23, at 487. 
56 CIHLS, supra note 54, rule 99. 
57 See, e.g., ICRC, “Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards for Security Detention in Non-International Armed 
Conflict Experts Report”, 2008, at 4 (‘The experts agreed that it flows from the practice of armed conflict and the 
logic of IHL that parties to a conflict may capture persons deemed to pose a serious security threat and that such 
persons may be interned as long as they continue to pose a threat. Otherwise, the alternatives would be to either 
release or kill captured persons.’) (emphasis added). 
58 O. W. Holmes, The Common Law 1(1881). 
59 M. N. Schmitt, “Wound, Capture, or Kill: A Reply to Ryan Goodman’s ‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy 
Combatants”’, 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 855, 857. 
60 Debuf, supra note 23, at 466. 
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compromise between … two opposing forces’: humanity and military necessity.61 When analysing 
the object and purpose of the norms providing safeguards to the detained and interned persons, 
both of these broader overarching goals should be taken into account.62 Once the applicable 
rules are seen from this perspective, the compatibility of a legal power to detain with the object 
and purpose of IHL becomes much more apparent. As the US Military Tribunal held in the 
Hostages case, military necessity ‘permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and other 
persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of the war; it allows 
the capturing of armed enemies and others of peculiar danger’.63 It can thus be seen that recourse to a 
teleological interpretation of the applicable law does not significantly assist the opponents of a 
legal basis for detention in NIACs. 
The second argument focusses on the practical consequences of the absence of an explicit 
legal basis for detention. According to this position, without such a legal basis, it is impossible to 
determine ‘who may be detained, on what grounds, in accordance with what procedures, or for 
how long’.64 It is true that no specific criteria can be found in the text of the applicable treaty law. 
However, this does not appear to be an insurmountable obstacle, as can be illustrated on the 
issue of the substantive grounds for detention.65  
The requisite criteria in this connection can be borrowed from the law of IAC, which 
provides that persons may be interned if ‘absolutely necessary’ for the security of the detaining 
power on its own territory66 or for ‘imperative reasons of security’ in occupied territory.67 The 
ICRC has proposed that the latter standard of ‘imperative reasons of security’ be co-opted in 
situations of NIAC68 as it ‘strikes a workable balance between the need to protect personal 
liberty and the detaining authority’s need to protect against activity seriously prejudicial to its 
security’.69 It is submitted that this is the correct approach. It has been successfully applied in 
practice, as confirmed by a growing body of international and domestic jurisprudence.70 It has 
also been expressly endorsed as the applicable standard by at least one State.71 Finally, it is 
sufficiently flexible to allow for adjustment on the basis of specific operational reality in a 
particular conflict.  
                                                          
61 M. N. Schmitt, “Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate 
Balance” 50 Va. J. Int’l L. 795, 798 (2010). 
62 See C.  H. B. Garraway, ‘‘To Kill or Not to Kill?—Dilemmas on the Use of Force” 14 J. Conflict & Security L. 499, 
501 (2010); see also M. N. Schmitt, “Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements” 
42 Int’l L. & Politics 697, 713 (2010). 
63 List et al, Judgment (US Military Tribunal, 19 February 1948) 8 L. Rpts. Trials of War Criminals 34, 1253 (1949) 
(emphasis added). 
64 Serdar Mohammed, supra note 1, para. 246. 
65 For a detailed consideration of the applicable procedural guarantees, see ICRC, Handbook on International Rules 
Governing Military Operations (ICRC 2013), at 246–251. 
66 See GC IV, supra note 11, Art. 42(1). 
67 See GC IV, supra note 11, Art. 78(1). 
68 See ICRC, “Strengthening Legal Protection for Persons deprived of their Liberty in relation to Non-International 
Armed Conflict”, Background Paper, Geneva, (2013), online: 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2013/strengthening-legal-protection-detention-consultations-2012-2013-
icrc.pdf, at 13. 
69 J. Pejić, “The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye” 93 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 189, 209 
(2011). 
70 See Sivakumaran, supra note 29, at 302 notes 460–461. 
71 See United Kingdom, Joint Doctrine Publication 1-10, Captured Persons (CPERS), 1-18, para. 148 (3rd ed., 2015). 
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It has been suggested that such transposition of criteria from the law of IAC would flout the 
principle of legality, which is said to oppose ‘any deprivation of liberty by analogy’.72 However, 
this position conflates the question of the existence of a legal basis with the question of the 
substantive grounds for detention. It is submitted that if a legal basis for detention can be found 
within the law of NIAC, then complementing it with specific criteria from the law of IAC does 
not undermine but rather strengthens the principle of legality. This is in line with the ICRC’s 
understanding of this principle, according to which the principle requires ‘that a person may only 
be interned or administratively detained on grounds … set out in national and/or international 
law’.73 The criterion of ‘imperative reasons of security’ is patently found within the established 
corpus of international law.74 Hence, its use in the context of NIAC should not be seen as an 
impermissible use of analogiam legis in contravention of the principle of legality, but rather as a 
welcome constraint on the putative broad power to detain appertaining to each conflict party. In 
other words, the transposition of a workable restrictive standard from the law of IAC fosters the 
rule of law in NIAC — provided, of course, that a power to detain can indeed be located in the 
law of NIAC of its own accord. This is a question considered in the next section. 
V. A CASE IN FAVOUR OF A LEGAL BASIS TO DETAIN 
Although it has been said that too much emphasis ought not to be placed on purely logical 
reasoning due to the specificities of international law,75 as a starting point of any legal analysis, 
the law should be presumed to be internally coherent and logical.76 It has been demonstrated that 
the existence of a legal basis for detention in NIAC is consistent with the requirements of logic 
as otherwise a frequent and necessary incident of war would have to be perceived as unlawful. It 
remains to be seen whether there are additional positive reasons supporting the existence of a 
legal power to detain in the law of NIAC. Three will be examined concerning, in turn, the 
drafting history of the relevant treaty provisions, the development of customary IHL, and the 
effectiveness of IHL as a whole. 
As an aside, it is important to bear in mind that if there is a legal basis to detain arising from 
IHL, it must be equally available to all parties to the relevant armed conflicts. This is a 
consequence of the principle of the equality of the parties to the conflict on which the law of 
NIAC is based just as much as the law of IAC.77 The applicability of this conception of equality 
of belligerents to the norms governing detention is confirmed by the comments of the drafters 
after the relevant provisions of Additional Protocol II had been adopted in Committee I during 
the 1974–77 diplomatic conference. Strikingly, the fact that the rules in question apply equally to 
all conflict parties was both lauded by the supporters of strict equality of NIAC law like France78 
                                                          
72 See Debuf, supra note 23, at 473. 
73 See ICRC, Handbook on International Rules governing Military Operations (2013), at 247. 
74 See GC IV, supra note 11, Art. 78(1). 
75 See text to notes 58–59 supra. 
76 See further R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 225-275(1986) (arguing for a conception of law as integrity). 
77 See ICRC Commentary, supra note 24, at 1345, para. 4437; Sivakumaran, supra note 29, at 242–243; see also Somer, 
supra note 37, at 663 (distinguishing the equality of rights and obligations from a general equality of status and 
emphasizing that the principle of the equality of conflict parties only relates to the former type of equality). 
78 Official Records, supra note 26, vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.40, para. 34. 
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and (begrudgingly) acknowledged by its detractors including Syria79 and Iraq.80 Therefore, it is 
submitted that any IHL-based resolution of the question at hand must also be applied equally to 
all conflict parties.81 
Firstly, the fact that detention was an indelible part of the conduct of hostilities in NIAC was 
well understood already at the time of the adoption of Additional Protocol II.82 An examination 
of the travaux préparatoires reveals that States accepted that all parties to the conflicts would resort 
to detention and internment. During the diplomatic conference held in Geneva, a number of 
State representatives expressly mentioned detention by non-State actors in connection to the 
safeguards provided by the eventual Articles 5 and 6 of Protocol II.83 Notably, no suggestion was 
made that such detention would be unlawful or that it would have to be justified on the basis of 
domestic law. It is safe to assume that the drafters understood that any such requirement would 
be unrealistic in the conditions of a NIAC.  
Later during the conference, the question of the scope of the current Article 5 (ex-Article 8) 
was discussed. The representative of the United Kingdom, Col. Draper asked the ICRC 
representative to explain the scope of the provision as its text had been copied over from the 
original ICRC draft.84 Speaking on behalf of the ICRC, Mrs. Bujard replied that the provision 
‘had been intended to cover all persons whose liberty had been restricted’ including ‘persons 
interned without judicial proceedings’.85 This explanation was accepted expressly by the Italian 
representative86 and tacitly by the remaining delegates when they adopted the proposed text by 
consensus and without any objections as to the interpretation advanced by the ICRC.87 The 
ICRC commentary to Article 5 interprets these statements as confirming that the provision 
covers ‘both persons being penally prosecuted and those deprived of their liberty for security 
reasons, without being prosecuted under penal law’.88  
Taken together, it is clear that the drafters contemplated detention by all parties to the 
conflict and were aware of the possibility that a legal basis for such detention would not be 
forthcoming in domestic law. Admittedly, these statements cannot be taken to amount to an 
outright recognition of an implicit legal basis to detain under IHL. However, the travaux appear 
                                                          
79 Official Records, supra note 26, vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.40, para. 4. 
80 Official Records, supra note 26, vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.40, para. 29. 
81 See also ICRC, ‘Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards for Security Detention in Non-International Armed 
Conflict Experts Report’, 4 (2008) (‘There was prevailing agreement that any party to a NIAC has an inherent power 
or “qualified right” to intern persons captured.’) (emphasis added). 
82 For a similar point in relation to the 1949 diplomatic conference, see the discussion of the travaux préparatoires in R. 
Chesney & J. Goldsmith, “Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models” 60 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1079, 1086, note 26 (2008) (concluding that drafters ‘appeared to assume that military detention would exist in 
at least some NIACs’). 
83 See, e.g., Official Records, supra note 26, vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.32, para. 71 (Canada) (noting that as the provisions 
were to apply in a NIAC, ‘one of the parties would not be a government and would therefore have only rudimentary 
facilities at its disposal’); ibid., para. 73 (USSR) (highlighting the importance of the provisions being ‘observed by all 
Parties to the conflict’); ibid., para. 87 (India) (criticising the text of the proposed Art 8 (now Art 5) for the 
improbability that it would ‘be implemented by all the forces concerned’). 
84 Official Records, supra note 26, vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.33, paras. 10–14. 
85 Official Records, supra note 26, vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.33, para. 17. 
86 Official Records, supra note 26, vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.33, para. 18. 
87 Official Records, supra note 26, vol. VIII, CDDH/I/SR.39, at 414 (reporting that paras 1(a) and (b) of ex-Art 8 were 
adopted by consensus). 
88 ICRC Commentary, supra note 24, 1386, para. 4568. 
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at the very least consistent with the proposition that such a legal basis exists and certainly do not 
exclude this possibility.89 
Secondly, the perspective of the development of customary law adds further support in 
favour of the existence of a legal basis to detain in NIACs. There is plenty of State practice 
confirming the resort to detention in NIACs by all conflict parties. One study refers to 
‘numerous examples in which international armed conflict-style detention frameworks have been 
used during NIAC’ in the period between 1949 and 1977,90 highlighting in particular the 
detention of prisoners in Yemen, Algeria, the Congo, and Nigeria.91 Another scholar points to 
extensive State practice, historical as well as modern, to substantiate the claim that States have 
essentially treated civilian detention as an incident of waging war.92 Whatever its theoretical value 
for the formation of customary rules proper,93 there is a wealth of relevant practice on part of 
non-State armed groups, as well.94 
In addition to this rich practice, express statements of a corresponding opinio juris appeared 
recently in particular with respect to detention in extraterritorial NIACs. The leading proponent 
of the view that detention in NIACs is (implicitly) authorized by IHL is the United States. 
Already in 2004, the US Supreme Court held in Hamdi that ‘the authority to detain for the 
duration of the relevant conflict’ is compatible with ‘longstanding law-of-war principles’.95 This 
position was adopted by the US executive which has since referred to it on a number of 
occasions.96 In Hamlily, the US District Court for the District of Columbia accepted the 
Government’s position and held expressly that ‘the power to detain … is consistent with the law 
of war principles governing non-international conflicts’.97 
In the context of the Serdar Mohammed case, the Government of the United Kingdom 
expressly supported the same view, arguing that ‘IHL provides a legal basis for detention by UK 
armed forces’ in the context of the NIAC in Afghanistan.98 This appears to be a reversal of its 
                                                          
89 But see Debuf, supra note 23, at 470 (interpreting the travaux as ‘affirm[ing] that the adoption of such a legal basis 
must be left to the domestic legal order of the State affected by such a conflict’). Regrettably, this interpretation is 
not substantiated by any direct references to the actual drafting history.  
90 See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 82, at 1086. 
91 Ibid., at 1087, note 29. 
92 Goodman, supra note 29, at 57–58. 
93 See, e.g., CIHLS, supra note 54, at xxxvi (considering the legal significance of non-State actors’ practice as ‘unclear’). 
94 See Sivakumaran, supra note 29, at 292–305. 
95 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 US 507 (2004), at 521. 
96 See, e.g., United States, Second Periodic Report to the Committee against Torture, 13 January 2006, UN Doc. 
CAT/C/48/Add.3/Rev.1, submitted 6 May 2005, Annex 1, at 48, para. 1 (‘There is no question that under the law 
of armed conflict, the United States has the authority to detain persons who have engaged in unlawful belligerence 
until the cessation of hostilities.’); United States, District Court of Colombia, ‘Respondents’ Memorandum regarding 
the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay’, in re: Guantanamo Bay 
Detainee Litigation, 13 March 2009, online: http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf, at 5 
(‘the United States has the authority to detain those who were part of al-Qaida and Taliban forces’ based, inter alia, 
upon ‘long-standing … law-of-war principles’); United States, Speech by the Legal Adviser, US Department of State, 
‘The Obama Administration and International Law’, given at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of 
International Law, Washington DC, 25 March 2010 (‘As a nation at war, we must comply with the laws of war, but 
detention of enemy belligerents to prevent them from returning to hostilities is a well-recognized feature of the 
conduct of armed conflict, as the drafters of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II recognized and as our 
own Supreme Court recognized in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.’). 
97 Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F.Supp.2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009), at 70. 
98 See Serdar Mohammed, supra note 1, para. 232. 
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previously held position99 and it was, as stated above, rejected by the court in the first-instance 
ruling in the case.100 Nonetheless, the UK has since updated its Joint Doctrine Publication 1-10 
concerning captured persons, which now states that the power to intern civilians in NIAC is ‘is 
usually derived from a UNSCR, from the Law of Armed Conflict or from host nation law’.101 This 
refined position of the UK Government will likely receive another round of judicial attention in 
the appellate proceedings in Serdar Mohammed in February 2015.102 At the present moment, it may 
be summarized that the UK Government, like the US, seems to accept that IHL itself may be 
the source of a legal power to detain in NIAC. 
The importance of these statements is underscored by the fact that they relate to conflicts in 
which alternative sources for a legal power to detain — such as domestic law or a Security 
Council resolution — were not forthcoming.103 Moreover, they have not attracted any protest or 
denunciation from other members of the international community. Instead, they appear to be 
consistent with a general trend to no longer see IHL as ‘prohibitive law’ that it might have been 
in the early 1950s104 but at least to some extent as a permissive body of law, authorizing conduct 
that might otherwise amount to a violation of other norms of international law, particularly 
human rights law.105 As the statements emanate from a limited number of countries, it would be 
overstating the point to interpret them as confirming in and of themselves the formation of a 
corresponding customary rule.106 The fact that they have not been subsequently controverted, 
however, adds weight to the contention that the legal basis for detention is in fact inherent to 
IHL. 
Finally, this contention is further strengthened by a concern for the effectiveness of IHL. Few 
would doubt that the effectiveness of the law is a desirable normative goal in general;107 with 
                                                          
99 See, e.g., United Kingdom, Joint Doctrine Publication 1-10, Prisoners of War, Internees and Detainees, 2nd ed., 
May 2006, at 1-7, para. 113(a) (in NIAC, ‘power [to detain] may derive from the host state’s own domestic law or 
from a UN Security Council Resolution’); Serdar Mohammed, supra note 1, para. 40, citing UK MOD memorandum 
dated 1 March 2006 (‘there is currently no basis upon which we can legitimately intern … individuals’ who ‘pose a 
substantial and imminent threat to UK forces’ in the context of the NIAC in Afghanistan); Serdar Mohammed, supra 
note 1, para. 44, citing UK MOD memorandum dated June 2008 (‘In Afghanistan, however, we cannot replicate 
Iraq arrangements because UK forces have no power to intern under the extant UNSCR (only a power to temporarily 
detain is inferred).’) (emphasis added). 
100 Serdar Mohammed, supra note 1, para. 268. 
101 United Kingdom, Joint Doctrine Publication 1-10, Captured Persons (CPERS), 3rd ed., 1-18, para 148 (2015) 
(emphasis added). 
102 See Case Tracker for Civil Appeals, Case Reference A2/2014/1862, online:  http://casetracker.justice.gov.uk/. 
103 But see Debuf, supra note 23, at 471, note 1534 (listing conflicts in which States relied on domestic legislation to 
argue against the existence of a legal basis to intern in customary IHL). It is submitted that the relevance of 
examples such as those given in this work is limited. They do confirm that where an express legal basis is available in 
domestic law, States may rely on it in relation to their detention practice. Conversely, these examples do not 
undermine the possibility that the States in question considered their practice equally authorized by IHL. 
104 Richard Baxter, ‘So-Called Unprivileged Belligerency: Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs’ 28 Brit. Y. B. Int’l L. 323, 
324 (‘The law of war is … “prohibitive law”, in the sense that it forbids rather than authorizes certain manifestations 
of force.’) (internal footnotes omitted). 
105 See, e.g., Kreß, supra note 29, 260–261; M. Milanović, “End of Application of International Humanitarian Law”, 
Int’l Rev. Red Cross 26 (forthcoming; online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2486435) (2015). 
106 But see International Law Association (ILA), Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary 
International Law, 32, para. 16 (2000) (it is not necessary to demonstrate the existence of a belief on the part of the 
generality of States in order to prove the existence of a corresponding customary rule). 
107 See, e.g., G. Lamond, “The Rule of Law”, in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (A. Marmor ed., 2015), 500 
(‘For the Rule of Law to prevail in a community, the law must be effective in guiding its subjects.’). 
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respect to IHL, it is even more relevant given the prominence of the duty ‘to respect and to 
ensure respect for’ IHL codified in Common Article 1.108 To reject the existence of an IHL-
based legal power to detain in NIACs would, on balance, diminish the extent to which the norms 
of IHL are respected by the parties and it would likely lead to abuse.109  
With respect to armed groups, this outcome is the most evident. Without an available legal 
basis, any detention practice they would engage in—however operationally necessary it may be—
would violate the prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of liberty.110 The incentive to abide by IHL 
will certainly not be strengthened by interpretations insisting that a regular incident of the 
conduct of hostilities such as detention is unlawful at all times. On the contrary, such 
interpretation ‘makes waging war unrealistic and impossible’.111  
With respect to States, the effect would admittedly be limited to situations in which there is 
no alternative legal basis in domestic law or elsewhere. Still, extraterritorial conflicts of the 
modern age prove that such situations are more than just the subject of academic speculation. As 
the reactions to the Serdar Mohammed case powerfully illustrate, an interpretation rejecting a legal 
basis would risk emasculating States engaged in extraterritorial NIACs.112 Again, such an 
outcome would do little for the abidance with the law and, even if accepted, it would likely 
dissuade States from preferring capture over killing in their conduct of hostilities.113 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The question of the existence of a legal basis to detain under the law of NIAC is a difficult one. 
Its analysis shines light into one of the murky corners of the law of armed conflict. That an 
express legal basis is nowhere to be found is understandable given the asymmetry at the core of 
any armed conflict between a State and a non-State party. Few States are keen to provide 
potential insurgents with an explicit written encouragement to set up their own detention 
facilities in defiance of the legitimate government. Yet this lack of authorizing language may 
equally turn against the States in situations where detention cannot be justified under any of the 
other potentially applicable bodies of law, as so aptly demonstrated by the Serdar Mohammed case.  
                                                          
108 Common Art. 1 to the Geneva Conventions. See also R. Ziegler, “Non-Refoulment between ‘Common Article 1’ and 
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It should be acknowledged that both potential answers to the main question have their 
appeal. The position rejecting the existence of a legal power to detain under the valid law of 
NIAC highlights the ‘H’ in IHL and reminds us of the importance of the humanitarian purpose 
of the law.114 What is more, it can be taken as encouraging further legal development in the sense 
of finding a comprehensive solution de lege ferenda. It is conceivable that, when combined with the 
initiatives spearheaded by the ICRC115 and others,116 in the long run this development could take 
the shape of a multilateral treaty specifying not only the legal basis, but also other modalities of 
detention, including substantive grounds and procedural guarantees.117 However, for now such 
an outcome appears unlikely and many States do not hide their reluctance about participating in 
any further codification projects.118 Regrettably, the no-legal-basis position will in many cases 
simply condone a state of unlawfulness. 
It is thus submitted that, on balance, the interpretation that the legal basis for detention in 
NIAC is inherent in IHL is to be preferred. Although it is accurate to say that this position ‘flows 
from … the logic of IHL’,119 it is justified by more than just logical inference. In fact, some of 
the syllogistic reasoning in favour of this position that had appeared in the literature has been 
revealed here as unconvincing.120 Instead, it is the combination of three practical perspectives 
which, when taken together, validate the proposed interpretation. First, a close examination of 
the travaux préparatoires confirms that the existence of an implicit legal basis is consistent with the 
understandings and expectations of the drafters in 1977. Second, the post-World War II practice 
and some modern-day pronouncements corroborate the existence of an inherent legal basis in 
customary IHL. Third, in the light of the challenges posed by modern conflicts marked by the 
asymmetry of the parties and by the extraterritoriality of the hostilities, the law of NIAC is far 
more effective if it is interpreted to contain a legal power to detain than when it is not. 
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